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2.1  Introduction 
The possibility of contagion in currency crises across countries is highly 
topical, to say the least. Though the phenomenon is widely discussed and 
is supported by solid empirical evidence,’ construction of convincing theo- 
retical models of contagion is still in  its infancy. Moreover, in existing 
models of contagion, political aspects of the decision whether to defend a 
currency against attack, central to the “new generation” crisis models, do 
not play an important role. This paper argues that political factors of two 
sorts may be key to understanding some examples of apparent contagion, 
most importantly the European Monetary System (EMS) crisis of 1992- 
93. First, the political nature of the decision to devalue, combined with 
incomplete information about government objectives in making this deci- 
sion, is often crucial to the appearance of speculative pressures. Second, 
when one of a country’s principal objectives in maintaining a fixed ex- 
change rate is (explicit or implicit) political integration with its “neigh- 
bors,” a devaluation by  one of those neighbors will increase speculative 
pressures on the country. This argument is especially relevant to the EMS 
but is not limited to it. 
In  section 2.2 models of speculative attack are summarized to make 
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clear the political nature of the devaluation decision. In section 2.3 ex- 
isting models of contagion are summarized, as is the concept of political 
contagion introduced in this paper. In section 2.4 a very simple model is 
presented, along with a discussion of  how it may be easily extended to a 
multiperiod framework. Section 2.5 suggests why,  on the basis of varied 
types of evidence, political contagion may  have been important in the 
1992-93  EMS crisis. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2  Models of Speculative Attack 
In Krugman’s seminal 1979 paper on exchange rate collapse, an incon- 
sistency in fundamentals induces a steady loss in reserves, ending in  an 
abandonment  of fixed rates. For example, the government is running a 
deficit and is financing it by printing money. The rate of monetary expan- 
sion is  inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate in the long run; in the 
short run, individuals do not want to hold the higher level of domestic 
currency  and exchange it for foreign-currency-denominated  assets. The 
peg rate must be abandoned when reserves hit a minimum level, which is 
common knowledge to all market participants. However, the peg collapses 
not at the date implied by  simply extrapolating the steady decline of re- 
serves but in a speculative attack at some earlier date, namely, the first date 
at which optimal investor behavior implies such an attack will  succeed. 
Krugman’s model of  the inevitable abandonment of an unsustainable 
peg was a major step in understanding how currencies collapse, and it has 
been extended in a number of directions. It has been criticized, however, 
because its description of the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate is 
clearly unrealistic in some cases. In the Krugman model policymakers are 
passive, sticking with current mutually inconsistent policies and abandon- 
ing the fixed rate reflexively when the critical minimum level of reserves 
is reached. They neither take an aggressive role in defending the current 
exchange rate policy, nor do they adjust their commonly known policy 
objectives in light of external economic and political developments. 
Though it may be accurate in some instances to argue that a devaluation 
reflects the technical infeasibility of continuing current policy, a more ac- 
curate characterization of the behavior of policymakers in many cases is 
that the decision about whether to devalue reflects the balancing of con- 
flicting objectives. Deteriorating fundamentals are an important part of 
the story, but the decision to devalue is taken not because it is literally 
unavoidable but because of the importance of other objectives given exter- 
nal developments. Hence, devaluation is a political decision in that main- 
taining the peg is technically feasible (especially when a central bank can 
borrow reserves) but is seen by  the government as no longer optimal in 
light of the costs of doing so and the importance of other objectives. 
Krugman (1996) and others have applied the term “new crisis model” 
to models of currency crises that give a central role to government optimi- Political Contagion in Currency Crises  49 
zation and that characterize the devaluation decision in terms of a choice 
between conflicting objectives. As Krugman puts it in characterizing the 
new  crisis model, “A  government-no  longer a simple mechanism like 
that in the classical model, but rather an agent trying to minimize a loss 
function-must  decide whether or not to defend an exogenously specified 
exchange rate parity” (1996, 350). To the extent that weighing conflicting 
objectives is key to deciding how to respond to speculative pressures, po- 
litical considerations are central to the new crisis model. Examples of this 
approach include Obstfeld (1994), Drazen and Masson (1994), Masson 
(1995), Ozkan and Sutherland (1995), Obstfeld (1996), and Bensaid and 
Jeanne (1997).’ 
In these models, however, the treatment of speculators is far less meticu- 
lous than the treatment of policymakers: the latter are modeled as solv- 
ing an explicit, well-formulated optimization problem; the former act opti- 
mally,  but the optimization problem is generally either left implicit or is 
quite  simplified. The problem of  formulating devaluation expectations 
is stressed, but the information structure under which this takes place is 
quite simple. In Obstfeld (1 994, 1996), for example, speculator behavior is 
summarized by their expectations of a devaluation, rationally conditioned 
on the government’s optimal response to a single underlying shock and on 
the common-knowledge distribution of that shock. Drazen and Masson 
(1994) and Masson (1995) add uncertainty about the policymaker’s objec- 
tives (the policymaker’s “type”) and consider how it will interact with un- 
certainty about fundamentals. 
A  more  realistic model  of  optimal  speculator behavior should have 
them solving a more complicated, dynamic signal extraction problem in 
which there are several types of shocks. Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) is more 
satisfactory in this respect, with the probability of devaluation being de- 
rived via Bayesian updating of the policymaker’s type. Drazen (1 999) con- 
siders a dynamic model that allows for several types of shocks, where the 
rational  expectations of  devaluation are formed by  Bayesian updating 
based on the history of policies and the current shock. In that model what is 
crucial in forming expectations of devaluation is not simply what policies 
were previously observed but also the circumstances in which they were 
observed. Not surprisingly, the information-based model of contagion pre- 
sented here will be based on that model, though in a simplified form. 
2.3  Contagious Currency Crises 
“Contagion” appears to be the latest buzzword in foreign currency mar- 
kets  and in  asset markets more generally. However, carefully reasoned 
2. A model based on an optimizing government is not identical to one with multiple equi- 
libria and the resultant  possibility of  self-fulfilling crises. A new crisis model can have a 
unique equilibrium, as in Drazen and Masson (1994), whereas a nonoptimizing model can 
have multiple equilibria, as discussed by Krugman (1996). 50  Allan Drazen 
explanations of the causes of contagion, or even of what constitutes con- 
tagion, are as rare as discussions of the phenomenon are ~ommon.~  I will 
apply the term to currency crises to refer to the phenomenon whereby a 
currency crisis itselj’in one country makes a currency crisis (or currency 
weakness) in another country more likely. The emphasis is meant to dif- 
ferentiate true contagion from a common shock (other than a currency cri- 
sis) that affects countries differentially because of their differential suscep- 
tibility to infection. When differential vulnerability to an unobserved com- 
mon shock reflects unobserved characteristics, we may get what looks like 
true contagion because a crisis in one country will be followed by a crisis 
in  another, with no apparent explanation  other than the original crisis 
itself. This is an identification problem well known in epidemiology. Fol- 
lowing the very clear discussion in Masson (1998), we call these “mon- 
soonal  effect^."^ 
Masson makes a further distinction, arguing that contagion should be 
applied only to the case “where a crisis in one country may conceivably 
trigger a crisis elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic fun- 
damentals” (1998,2; emphasis added). When a crisis in one country affects 
the fundamentals in another country (e.g., because a devaluation reduces 
the competitiveness of other countries and thus makes them more likely 
to devalue), he uses the term “spillover.” I will use the term “contagion” 
more generally. 
2.3.1 
A well-developed  general  model  of  contagion  is  that  of  information 
“cascades,” in which asymmetrically informed investors acquire informa- 
tion sequentially by  observing the actions of others who precede them. 
(See, e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,  and Welch  1992.) Agent  2 on the 
basis  of  his own information  may prefer  action A to action  B,  but he 
observes agent  1 choosing B. He thus infers that agent  1 has information 
favoring B, and this may push agent 2 to choose B as well. Agent 3, observ- 
ing two previous  choices of B, may also conclude that B is optimal, al- 
though his private information alone would imply choosing A. And so on. 
The general information cascade model may be more relevant for differ- 
entially informed investors in a given market than for contagion across 
foreign  exchange  markets.  Two  basic  assumptions  for  an information 
cascade would  not appear to be satisfied in  foreign  exchange markets: 
the cascade model relies on significant differences in private information 
across agents, but it is far from clear that there are such informational 
Three General Models of Contagion 
3. E.g., the most common reason by far that market traders gave for devaluation contagion 
within the EMS in the Eichengreen and Wyplosz survey was that “markets ‘tasted blood’ 
(realized that there were profits to be made)” (1993, 98). 
4.  Masson focuses on shocks from industrial countries affecting Asian emerging markets, 
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differences across large investors for major currencies; and the cascade 
model relies on significant transactions costs in order to generate sequen- 
tial behavior, but foreign exchange markets are not characterized by such 
high transactions costs. Moreover, in discussions of  the applicability of 
cascades to contagious currency crises, it is not clear what is the relevant 
information transferred across currency markets. 
Less formally, the idea of informational externalities has been applied 
to foreign exchange markets as follows. It is argued that with uncertainty 
about policymakers’ commitments to defending fixed exchange rates, the 
collapse of the exchange rate in one country may provide information that 
another country in similar macroeconomic circumstances is more likely 
to abandon its fixed parity. Though the argument is often heard, the logic 
is often incomplete. One could justify it in terms of a common unobserved 
shock that affects countries differentially due to different macroeconomic 
circumstances, but this is a monsoonal effect, rather than true contagion. 
As a contagion story, one must make clear what new information that is 
relevant to the second currency is being provided by  the collapse of the 
first currency. Since devaluation in the first country provides no new infor- 
mation either about macroeconomic conditions per se (but see the argu- 
ments about spillovers below) or about the policy-making process in the 
second country (but see the discussion of political contagion in subsection 
2.3.2 below) a less direct mechanism of contagion may be present. 
More specifically, the argument that the collapse of the exchange rate 
in one country implies that another country in  similar macroeconomic 
circumstances is more likely to abandon its fixed parity may be probabil- 
istic or statistical. Market participants envision a collapse scenario that 
could occur under certain circumstances but assign it a low probability 
until it actually occurs in such circumstances. They then raise the probabil- 
ity of  its occurring in similar circumstances elsewhere, perhaps increas- 
ing their speculation against those other countries. Hence, a crisis in one 
country, previously assigned low probability, may raise the probability of 
devaluation elsewhere. This is not herding to a currently faddish theory of 
contagion (a phenomenon that may itself be present), but statistical updat- 
ing on the basis of drawing another observation favorable to a theory. 
Another type of contagion model is a “spillover” model (to use Mas- 
son’s terminology), focusing on trade linkages. This has been modeled for- 
mally by  Gerlach and Smets (1995) and Eichengreen et al. (1996). An 
attack-induced devaluation in one country enhances its competitiveness, 
leading to trade deficits and declining reserves for its trading partners, 
making their currencies more ~ulnerable.~  If one looks simply at bilateral 
trade linkages, the idea may be relevant for some cases (as in the effect of 
5. An alternative argument is that changes in the price levels of trading partners reduce 
demand for money, leading to a depletion of reserves. 52  Allan Drazen 
the floating of the Finnish markka on 8 September  1992 on speculation 
against the Swedish krona,  as discussed by  Gerlach and Smets), but it 
does not appear to be a general explanation. The magnitudes seem wrong 
because “contagious” attacks hit currencies where the bilateral trade vol- 
umes just are not large enough. However, this bilateral view is probably 
too  limited, for we  should consider multilateral  linkages, whereby two 
countries compete against one another in the same third-country market. 
Theoretically, this appears relevant for Asian countries with significant 
exports to Japan or the United States. However, the trade magnitudes are 
probably still too small to explain contagion beginning in Thailand, even 
when both bilateral trade and third-market trade are included. 
An analogous argument is that spillovers occur via financial markets, 
as third-country investors liquidate their positions in one country to cover 
crisis-induced losses in another. It is far harder to assess empirically how 
important this was in the recent Asian crisis. In any case, this vehicle for 
contagion  seems of  little relevance for the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) crisis of 1992-93. 
A third line of argument is that contagion is linked to the possibility of 
multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling speculative attacks. Masson (1  998), 
in fact, argues that only models of this sort are capable of producing true 
contagion, reflecting his view  (see above) that contagion, by  definition, 
refers to the simultaneous occurrence of currency crises not linked to mac- 
roeconomic fundamentals. In his model, a crisis is the result of a deteriora- 
tion of the current account, reflecting in turn extremely high debt service. 
Interest rates include a devaluation premium, so that the expectation of a 
devaluation can be self-fulfilling. Masson’s argument concentrates on the 
simultaneity of a number of such episodes, rather than a causal link be- 
tween them. Similarly, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) suggest that high 
unemployment leads market participants to anticipate a future loosening 
of monetary policy, inducing speculation against the currency. The costs 
of defending the currency rise, due in part to the induced upward pressure 
on interest rates, so that a country may in fact devalue where it would 
not have in the absence of speculative pressure. Hence, the expectation 
of monetary loosening becomes self-fulfilling. This argument, as will  be 
discussed in section 2.5 below, is close to but not identical to the one pre- 
sented here. 
2.3.2  Political Contagion 
In the previous subsection, we summarized three general models of con- 
tagious currency crises. Each type of model is structured along the lines 
of the second-generation models of crisis, which stress the balancing of 
conflicting objectives in the devaluation decision, leading us to character- 
ize these models as “political.” The objectives themselves, however, are 
basically economic, and the nature of the contagion is thus economic as Political Contagion in Currency Crises  53 
well. In this paper, I want to introduce a fourth type of contagion that is 
inherently political, in that the objectives that give rise to contagion are 
primarily political. Contagion will be intrinsically political, for in the ab- 
sence of  the political  objective, devaluation  in  one country would not 
affect speculative pressure on another country’s currency. 
First, what does one mean by  “primarily political”  objectives in eco- 
nomic policy? Economic decisions are often made on the basis of largely 
political goals. Income distribution programs are a good case in point: 
transfers are made with the aim of maximizing votes for the incumbent 
party. The objective of a decision is clearly primarily  political when it 
supports a political objective that is in conflict with economic objectives. 
Hence, holding the exchange rate fixed for the purpose of enhanced politi- 
cal integration at significant economic cost is a primarily political deci- 
sion. As many have argued, this characterization describes the impetus 
toward fixed exchange rates in the move toward European Economic and 
Monetary  Union  (EMU). (Feldstein  1997 argues quite strongly on the 
primarily political nature of decisions surrounding EMU.) 
More generally, the point that the decision to keep a fixed parity may 
be primarily political can be put as follows. One component of increased 
political-economic integration with other countries is often the mainte- 
nance of a fixed exchange rate with respect to their currencies. This may 
reflect the desire to form some sort of explicit currency area or trading 
bloc, as, for example, in the case of the EMU. Or it may be less explicit, in 
the sense that “cooperative behavior” means refraining from competitive 
devaluations. Hence, one may think of membership in a  whether 
explicit or implicit, where the benefits of membership are heavily political 
and the condition for membership is the maintenance of a fixed exchange 
rate. (We consider in section 2.5 the specific institutional details that de- 
scribe the EMU as such a club.) 
The concept of political contagion in speculative attacks follows as an 
implication of the desire for political integration where maintenance of  a 
fixed exchange rate is a membership condition on each potential member 
of the integrated unit. One must make one further assumption, namely, 
that the value of membership in the arrangement depends positively on 
who else is or may be a member. Hence, if a country learns that other po- 
tential members of the arrangement place less weight on meeting the con- 
ditions required to  join and, hence, are less likely to participate, it will find 
less advantage in joining as well. It will therefore assign a lower value to 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate, especially when doing so requires sacri- 
ficing domestic goals. 
6.  I use the term “club” for lack of another term that is concise rather than cumbersome. 
One should note, however, that the role of clubs in providing public goods is not central to 
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To  complete  the  argument,  suppose  that  speculators  are  uncertain 
about a country’s commitment to a fixed rate because they are uncertain 
of the weight the country’s policymakers put  on conflicting objectives. 
Speculators know, however, that the desire for integration subject to the 
no-devaluation membership condition is an important objective. Rational 
behavior on their  part will then imply that  a successful attack on one 
currency (or perhaps even speculative pressure on the currency), revealing 
a weaker commitment than previously believed, creates an externality in 
the form of a lower commitment of  all other potential members. These 
countries will therefore be more vulnerable to atta~k.~  We term this conta- 
gious effect membership contagion. 
2.4  A Model of Membership Contagion 
In this section we present a simple model of membership contagion and 
discuss the underlying concept in greater detail in subsection 2.4.3. The 
possibility of a contagious currency crisis depends on incomplete infor- 
mation about government intentions, allowing revelation of information 
about the intentions of other countries to affect the probability of a deval- 
uation. This probability is derived under rational expectations, where it is 
shown how this probability depends on history, on the country’s current 
circumstances, and on the actions of other countries. 
To make things as simple as possible, we consider a single-period model, 
based on the more general multiperiod model presented in Drazen (1999). 
The more general model allows an explicit discussion of how rational de- 
valuation probabilities evolve over time as a function of a country’s cur- 
rent circumstances and the history of policy-specifically,  how informa- 
tion from the history of policy and the circumstances in which those policy 
decisions were made affects the current information set. Here this updat- 
ing of the past will be implicit, but it will be clear how the model is easily 
extended to a dynamic framework. 
The sequence of events in the model is as follows. A country that has 
maintained a fixed exchange rate experiences a stochastic shock q,  which 
is observed by  both the government and speculators. Speculators then 
choose a level of speculation against the currency, given q  and the proba- 
bility they assign to a devaluation (of known size) at the end of the period. 
Specifically, speculators borrow domestic currency to be repaid at the end 
of the period and use it to buy foreign currency reserves. Since main- 
7. This contagion argument should be distinguished from the earlier argument about the 
spillover of competitive pressures via real exchange rate effects in implicit trading arrange- 
ments. The previous argument concerned the trade effect of a lower real exchange rate fol- 
lowing a nominal devaluation, which induces a trading competitor to devalue. Here the argu- 
ment focuses on the contagious nature of “breaking the rules,’’ independent of any effects on 
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taining the fixed parity requires that reserves remain above some critical 
level, speculative demand for reserves determines a minimum interest rate 
i that must be maintained if the government is to defend the fixed parity. 
On the basis of -q and i, the government then decides whether to defend 
the fixed exchange rate (denoted by  choice of policy F) by  holding the 
interest rate at i or to abandon the parity and devalue (policy D) consistent 
with a lower interest rate. At the end of the period speculators sell their re- 
serves back to the government and pay off their borrowing. Though specu- 
lators use a range of information in deciding whether to attack a currency, 
we consider basically three types of shocks here: a country-specific factor 
that is unobservable to speculators (the country’s unobservable “type”), 
a country-specific shock that is observable to both the government and 
speculators, and, to model contagion, a cross-country observable shock.8 
New information relevant to speculators will  generally fall into one of 
these categories. 
2.4.1  Speculator Behavior 
As already indicated, key to speculator behavior is their borrowing of 
domestic currency in order to buy foreign currency reserves. Speculators 
are assumed to be atomistic, but the total cost of borrowing is assumed to 
be an increasing, convex function of the quantity borr~wed.~  This assump- 
tion allows us to maintain the simplicity of working with a parametric 
interest rate, rather than an interest rate schedule, but at the same time to 
prevent speculators from taking infinite speculative positions. Under these 
assumptions, one can easily show that total demand for reserves by profit- 
maximizing speculators is increasing in the probability p that speculators 
assign to a devaluation and decreasing in the cost of borrowing funds (see 
Drazen 1999). For simplicity, we make the further reasonable assumption 
that the cost of borrowing funds is such that demand for borrowing goes 
to zero as i approaches infinity and goes to zero asp  goes to zero. 
Suppose that maintaining the fixed exchange rate requires foreign cur- 
rency reserves to be above some minimum level. For given devaluation 
expectations, defending the fixed rate then requires keeping the interest 
rate high enough that total demand for reserves is no greater than this 
minimum level. (Speculators’ beliefs about the probability of a devalua- 
tion are fully summarized by p,  where we  discuss below how rational be- 
liefs are formed, conditional on available information.) This determines 
8. In a multiperiod version of the model, the country-specific unobservable “type” would 
be time invariant, while the observable country-specific shock would be time varying. 
9. In a multiperiod model, assuming that speculators can adjust their positions period by 
period allows us to retain the feature that in deriving their optimal position, risk-neutral 
speculators would need only to consider the probability of devaluation in the current period 
and would not need to form expectations of the probability of devaluation in future periods. 
See Drazen (1999). 56  Allan Drazen 
the lowest interest rate consistent with maintaining the fixed parity (the 
“minimum required interest rate”), which given our assumptions is an in- 
creasing, continuous function of p,  namely, i(  p). 
2.4.2  The Government’s Choice Problem 
We  now turn to the decision problem of a social-welfare-maximizing 
government that has an announced commitment to a fixed exchange rate. 
If the government is to maintain the fixed parity (policy F), it must raise 
the interest  rate to the level  i(p) consistent with maintaining sufficient 
foreign currency reserves, with the associated welfare loss due to the detri- 
mental effect of high interest rates on the domestic economy. Four areas 
of negative impact are generally mentioned: negative impact on economic 
activity, especially when the economy is seen as depressed; negative impact 
on mortgage interest rates, especially when these rates are directly indexed 
to money market rates and defense of the exchange rate requires holding 
market rates high for significant periods (as in the case of the United King- 
dom); impact of interest rates on increasing the budget deficit; and pos- 
sible destabilization of the banking system. We represent these losses by a 
function H(i,q),  where H is increasing and concave in both the domestic 
interest rate i and the shock -q and H(.) = 0 if the government chooses to 
devalue rather than defend the fixed parity. The shock q is observed by 
both the government and speculators. It is meant to represent any cur- 
rently observed factor known to affect the value the government may as- 
sign to maintaining a fixed exchange rate, such as changes in the level of 
foreign currency reserves or changes in domestic unemployment rates. 
Not defending the fixed parity  and devaluing has both  benefits and 
costs. Since our interest is in the latter, we  assume the benefits are sub- 
sumed in the function H.  Whereas the benefits of devaluation are generally 
purely economic, the cost of not defending a fixed exchange rate are more 
political in nature in  that  they are costs associated with reneging on a 
commitment. In a multiperiod model loss of reputation would be foremost 
among these. Membership effects, as discussed in subsection 2.3.2, present 
another example of this sort of cost when devaluing creates a bar to partic- 
ipation in a cooperative arrangement. Two aspects of this cost are impor- 
tant for our modeling of  contagion: first, that the cost the government 
assigns to devaluing is asymmetric information, known to the government 
but not fully known to speculators, and, second, that this cost depends, 
among other things, on (at least partially) known information about the 
commitment of other countries to the cooperative arrangement, or club, 
of the sort discussed in subsection 2.3.2 above.’O We consider them in turn, 
both in some detail. 
10. There is no contradiction between saying that the country’s commitment to the fixed 
rate is notfully known and the commitment of other countries to a cooperative arrangement, 
which may itself depend on their maintaining fixed rates, is at least partially known. If this 
point is not clear here, it will be below. Political Contagion in Currency Crises  57 
The first aspect, asymmetric information about a government’s inten- 
tions, is modeled as an element x which affects the loss from a devaluation, 
where x  is known  with certainty  only to the policymaker himself  (his 
“type”). Speculators, on the other hand, know only the distribution of pos- 
sible types as summarized by a distribution G(x) defined over [&,XI.  The 
information summarized by the distribution and its supports could reflect 
learning about the government on the basis of past observation of its poli- 
cies and of the circumstances in which these policies were undertaken, as 
will be discussed below. 
The second aspect is  summarized by  a parameter Z, an index of the 
value to the country of being in the club. 2 could be simply the number 
of other countries that satisfy the membership criteria, or it could be a 
weighted sum, with weights depending on the importance for the home 
country of a given country’s participation. More generally, Z could encom- 
pass the probability of the club arrangement coming into being, as a func- 
tion of the behavior of other countries. We present a fuller discussion of 
the determinants of Z in the next subsection. The loss 5 from a devaluation 
will equal XZ  if  the policymaker devalues and will equal zero otherwise. 
The trade-off that a social-welfare-maximizing policymaker faces if the 
currency is attacked-maintaining  the fixed exchange rate against main- 
taining low interest rates-may  then be represented by the loss function 
(1)  L  =  H(i,q)  +  5(xZ), 
where the second term is zero if the government defends the fixed exchange 
rate, while the first term is zero if it does not.” 
The government’s policy choice, given the realization q and the interest 
rate i(p)  required to maintain the fixed exchange rate consistent with spec- 
ulators’ beliefs, as summarized by p,  will be summarized by a cutoff type 
i  of policymaker who is just indifferent between devaluing and not devalu- 
ing. All types with x < 2 will devalue; all types with x 2  ,t  will maintain 
the fixed parity. To see why, first derive the cutoff i  by equating the value 
of L in equation (1) under policy F (so that L 
L = C),  so that 
The cutoff i = i(p,q,Z) is  continuous and 
= H)  and policy D (so that 
increasing in p  and q and 
continuous and decreasing in Z. For a type with x 2  i,  XZ  2 H,  so  that 
11. In a multiperiod framework the government would minimize a discounted loss func- 
tion in which each term  would take the form of eq. (l), where the cost ~(XZ)  would be 
interpreted as a one-time cost. Optimization would be forward looking, in that the implica- 
tions of policy F or D in any period for future trade-offs would be considered. See Drazen 
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it will be optimal to defend the fixed parity rather than devalue; for a type 
with x < i,  XZ  < H, so that it will  be  optimal to devalue. Hence, the 
cutoff rule fully characterizes a governments optimal behavior, and the 
probability of a devaluation depends on i(p,q,Z),  given 5 and G(x). For 
future use it is useful to denote by q the value of q such that i = g,  for 
given p and Z.  That is, q  is the value of q such that even the government 
type with the lowest cost of devaluation  finds it optimal to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate, so that the probability of a devaluation is zero. 
The nature of the optimal policy should be intuitive. Other things equal, 
the higher is speculation against the currency (summarized by p),  the more 
likely a government is to find it optimal to devalue, rather than keep inter- 
est rates high. (I.e., an increase in i  means that the probability that x lies 
below 2 increases.) The realization of an exogenous shock q  will affect the 
government’s incentive to devalue and, as we shall see, the equilibrium level 
of speculation itself. Finally, the fewer countries that are potential mem- 
bers of the association (or the less important are the other qualifying coun- 
tries, or the less likely for the association to come into being), the lower is 
Z  and the higher is i,  so the higher is the probability of a devaluation. 
The determination of 2,  and its implications for possible policy choices, 
also indicates how updating would take place in a multiperiod model. Sup- 
pose 2  is above g  in period t -  1, as it will be for sufficiently high q,  and 
the government chooses to defend the currency. This policy choice implies 
that the government’s x is above i,  so that the lower support of the distri- 
bution at the beginning of t will be 1  >  x,  the lower support in t -  1. This 
is simply Bayesian updating, with the implied updating of the distribution 
of G(x). If the realization of the current shock q  was sufficiently low that 
i 5  x,  all possible types would defend the fixed rate and the observation 
of policy F would provide no information, so the lower support of the 
distribution at the beginning oft + 1 would remain x.  Hence, the current 
lower support x  and the associated distribution G(x)  summarizes what has 
been learned about the government’s type prior to the current period on 
the basis of past observation of its policies and of the circumstances in 
which these policies were undertaken. The dynamics of speculative attacks 
based on such learning is the main focus of Drazen (1999), and this infer- 
ence problem is one of the two key features distinguishing the multiperiod 
model presented in that paper from the single-period example presented 
here. (The other is the government’s intertemporal optimization problem 
when it knows speculators are solving such an inference problem.)’* Al- 
though we  solve only a static problem,  this discussion, combined with 
the discussion of the government’s multiperiod objective in footnote  11, 
indicates how the model can be easily made dynamic. 
12. A very similar multiperiod inference problem, as applied to the information conveyed 
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2.4.3  Determinants of the Value of Membership 
The heart of the model of membership contagion is the parameter Z, 
indicating the value of membership in a club, which depends on who else 
is, or is not, in the club. The extent of membership contagion will then de- 
pend on the specification of the club for which no-devaluation is the key 
membership criterion. As already indicated, this club may be a formal ar- 
rangement, such as an explicit common currency area or a trading bloc, 
or a far less explicit arrangement. To the extent that governments see such 
clubs as important, the political nature of the decision about whether to 
devalue may be seen in part as the decision about which club to join, the 
club of devaluers or the club of nondevaluers. Furthermore, if  one views 
such clubs broadly, the club may be defined by politicians at the time de- 
valuation decisions are being debated, rather than simply being preexist- 
ing or previously agreed upon arrangements. Hence, the concept of mem- 
bership effects, and the possibility of contagion that arises from it, should 
be seen as including, but more broad than, simply explicit currency or 
trading arrangements. 
The easiest case is that of explicitly defined clubs with no-devaluation 
as an explicit membership criterion, as is the case of the EMU as discussed 
in  section 2.5. The link, however, from the no-devaluation  membership 
criterion to contagion may be simple and direct, or it may be more subtle. 
The simplest link is  where a devaluation  disqualifies one country from 
joining the club for at least  some period of time, and where the value 
to other potential members depends positively on that country’s being a 
member. A less direct link is one in which devaluation  by  one country 
does not literally disqualify it over the relevant time horizon but makes its 
participation, or perhaps the existence of the arrangement itself, discretely 
less likely, thus lowering the value of membership to other potential mem- 
bers, making them more likely to devalue. This may be a more accurate 
description of the possible causal link from eventual membership in the 
EMU and the contagious currency crises in the EMS in 1992-93.  An un- 
anticipated devaluation by one potential member will reveal lower com- 
mitment to fixed exchange rates than previously believed, not only to spec- 
ulators, but also to other potential members. This raises the probability 
they assign to that country’s devaluing in the future and thus lowers the 
probability they assign to its meeting the membership criterion when it 
becomes effective. 
In the context of an explicit currency union such as the EMU with a 
specific membership  criterion  of  no-devaluation  over a given horizon, 
there may be an even more subtle form of membership contagion. A deval- 
uation by a country that other potential members view as important may 
lead to a weakening of the membership rules themselves. Suppose there is 
a desire to maximize the likelihood that the EMU will come into being 60  Allan Drazen 
with, say, Italy as a member. Italian abandonment of the fixed parity in a 
way  that might disqualify it because of failure to meet the membership 
criterion may lead to the no-devaluation rule being weakened, though not 
scrapped entirely. The weaker criterion would make other countries more 
likely to devalue, as this would no longer disqualify them, as previously. If 
several countries cannot “clear the bar,” one might expect the bar to be 
lowered, so that others that could have will put less effort into maintaining 
fixed rates. One should be careful, however, in distinguishing between the 
argument that contagion may result from a devaluation-induced weaken- 
ing of a no-devaluation  criterion and the far stronger argument that  a 
country that devalued believed ex ante this would have no membership 
consequences. There is no real evidence that ERM countries that aban- 
doned their fixed parities in 1992-93  did so with the anticipation that the 
criteria would be changed in such a way that this would have no political 
costs, nor that a devaluation by a potential EMU member left the proba- 
bility of EMU unchanged. 
A related, though less formal, argument is that once a major player de- 
values and deviates from a previously solid arrangement, other players sud- 
denly realize, “It can be done!” This is a variant of the argument in subsec- 
tion 2.3.1 whereby contagion across countries in similar macroeconomic 
circumstances may reflect a probabilistic calculation, whereby seeing the 
phenomenon once significantly raises the probability that market partici- 
pants assign to its occurring elsewhere. Replacing “probability” by “possi- 
bility” and replacing “market participant” by  “government” shows how 
the analogy can be made. It has been argued that Britain’s leaving the gold 
standard in 1931 may have had contagious effects on other countries for 
this reason (see, e.g., Eichengreen and Jeanne, chap. 1 in this volume). 
What about less explicit clubs? More specifically, what sort of less ex- 
plicit clubs might generate membership effects? And how might member- 
ship be defined? On a regional basis, politicians may attach weight to being 
“lumped together” in the eyes of international investors with neighbors 
whose  economic  performance  is  especially  good,  while  differentiating 
themselves from countries in the same region whose performance is seen 
as poor. To the extent that there is a correlation between perceived perfor- 
mance and exchange rate regime, more specifically, fixed exchange rates, 
one obtains no-devaluation clubs. Such a club effect may be relevant for 
Asia or Latin America.13  One possibility for membership contagion then 
13. It seems quite relevant for France as well in the early part of the EMS period. In 
contrast to the strongly expansionary policies that the socialist government followed after 
coming to power in May  1981, there was an important change in behavior in June 1982, 
reinforced in March 1983, when France shifted to far tighter fiscal and monetary policies, 
the politique de rigueuv. The purpose of this change in policy, which had a serious cost in 
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comes from the argument in  the previous two  paragraphs, by  which  a 
devaluation by  one club member weakens the membership criterion and 
makes other  members more  likely  to devalue. That is,  if  one “success 
story” that previously maintained fixed rates suddenly devalues under spe- 
cific circumstances, governments may perceive that avoiding devaluations 
under all circumstances is no longer a criterion in the eyes of investors to 
be part of the favored group. Of course, when devaluation itself is seen as 
revealing weakness, “reverse contagion” may result. If devaluations by its 
neighbors are seen as revealing economic problems that may have a re- 
gional component, a country’s commitment to fixed exchange rates may 
be strengthened because it wants to make clear that it still belongs the no- 
devaluation club. The strength with which  China  and  Hong Kong de- 
fended their exchange rates in the recent Asian turmoil would appear to 
reflect reverse membership contagion. 
2.4.4  Speculator Inference and Rational Devaluation Beliefs 
In subsection 2.4.2 we  derived the optimal behavior of speculators on 
the basis of their beliefs about the probability of a devaluation p.  On the 
basis of speculator behavior, we  derived optimal behavior of the govern- 
ment in deciding whether to defend the fixed exchange rate. To close the 
model, we must ensure that the beliefs of speculators are consistent with 
government optimal behavior, that is, that they are rational. Hence, we 
must calculate the true probability of devaluation based on the beliefs p 
and equate them. 
Given the cutoff nature of the government’s optimal decision problem, 
the probability of  a devaluation should reflect beliefs over government 
types. These beliefs are fully summarized by  the set [&,XI and the condi- 
tional cumulative distribution associated with this set, G(x). The actual 
probability of a devaluation, call it IT, can then be calculated using G(x) 
and the cutoff type 2, namely, as G(2)  for states where 2 >  x  (i.e., for q > 
q,  as defined above) and zero otherwise. With the actual probability of 
devaluation IT  so defined, we  may relate it to the perceived probability p 
using the definition of 2 = f(p,q,Z)  in equation (2). Since our focus is not 
on the role of history as summarized by 5, we will suppress the dependence 
of  IT  on 5 and concentrate on the roles of q and 2.  The rational equilib- 
rium devaluation probability, for given values of q and 2,  is then 
- 
(3) 
lying government objectives. France made this change credible by accepting high unemploy- 
ment without devaluing. There were no realignments for a three-year period, despite unem- 
ployment rising above 10 percent. For a fuller discussion, see Drazen and Masson (1994). 62  Allan Drazen 
where q(Z)  is defined by equation (2) for i(O,q,Z) = x.  Equation (3) will 
alwaysbe satisfied for IT  = 0, as i(O,q,Z) <  There will be at least one 
interior solution for sufficiently high q,  given 2 (i.e., q > q(Z)),  or for 
sufficiently low 2,  given q.  Given the characteristics  of i.(p,q,Z) from 
equation (2) and the definition of IT(~,Z)  in equation (3), it is clear that 
the equilibrium level of speculation IT  is increasing in q and decreasing in 
2.  The solution r(q,Z)  is central to our analysis of the dynamics of conta- 
gious speculative attacks. 
The model admits the various types of contagion discussed above. An 
information cascade depends on what information is being  transmitted; 
membership contagion discussed below will provide an example. Conta- 
gion via spillover of  fundamentals can be represented by a change in funda- 
mentals in another country inducing an increase in 9,  and hence  in T. 
Contagion arising from multiple equilibria follows from the possibility of 
multiple solutions to equation (3). There will always be a solution n = 0, 
namely, where speculators believe there is no probability of a devaluation 
and do not speculate against the currency (due to the interest cost of bor- 
rowing), so that the government finds it costless to defend the currency. 
There may also be multiple interior solutions. (In this case, we  take the 
highest value of IT  that satisfies the first part of eq. [3] as the interior solu- 
tion for the discussion of other types of contagion, so that eq. [3] will have 
one positive and one zero solution.) 
Our focus is on political contagion in speculative attacks, more specifi- 
cally,  the  possibility  of  membership  contagion,  as discussed  subsection 
2.4.3. This would be characterized by the positive dependence of IT  on 2, 
the (possibly weighted) index of other potential members of the club. (A 
crucial assumption is that Z is known to both speculators and the govern- 
ment, as is the fact that ~(XZ)  is increasing in 2.)  Hence, as long as no- 
devaluation  is a membership  criterion  and a devaluation  provides  new 
information about 2,  one obtains true contagion: a successful speculative 
attack on one potential member country will increase the probability of 
attack on other potential members. 
2.5  Membership Contagion in the 1992-93  EMS Crisis 
We now ask whether there is any evidence relating speculative attacks 
in the 1992-93  EMS crisis to membership contagion. (As argued above, 
the concept is also applicable to the desire for membership in less formal 
cooperative arrangements, but we focus here on the EMS.) We present not 
formal econometric tests but evidence more in the nature of “case studies,” 
culled from other sources, suggesting that the concept may in fact be rele- 
vant. This will concern the answers to two questions: First, is there evi- 
dence that a devaluation in one country affected the probability of a de- Political Contagion in Currency Crises  63 
valuation in other countries? Second, if the answer to the first question 
is positive, is there evidence that this contagion may reflect membership 
effects? 
On the first question, there seems to be general agreement that Britain’s 
abandonment of its defense of the pound sterling in September 1992 did 
put pressure on some other European currencies. One can see this using 
the Eichengreen-Rose-Wyplosz index of crisis. More simply, looking at 
forward rates (measured as deutsche marks per unit of domestic currency), 
one can see a sharp fall in the rates for the Italian lira, the Spanish peseta, 
and the Irish punt, and a less sharp fall for the Danish krona and the 
French franc on 14 September 1  992.14  The Swedish abandonment of its de- 
fense of the krona in November appears to have had similar contagious 
implications. 
The far harder question is whether membership effects were involved. 
This may be itself divided into two questions. First, as far as immediate 
causation, does a devaluation by  one potential member lower the per- 
ceived probability of EMU? Second, does a lower probability of EMU ac- 
tually taking place lower the political resolve of potential members to de- 
fend their fixed parity? 
The first question is largely one of institutional detail, though not en- 
tirely, as the discussion in subsection 2.4.3 should make clear. As is well 
known, one of  the convergence criteria required to qualify for EMU is 
that a country maintain exchange rate stability: it must keep its currency 
within the EMS fluctuation bands “without severe tensions” for at least 
two years before joining the monetary union. A devaluation, even one 
time, outside the EMS bands may thus prevent a country from joining the 
EMU. This formal membership criterion could then lower the perceived 
probability of EMU either directly, if the devaluation occurred within two 
years of when the criterion would be relevant, or indirectly, whereby a 
devaluation at some point lowers the perceived probability of a wide EMU 
coming into being in the more distant future. This second linkage, more 
relevant when discussing the connection between the EMS crisis of  1992- 
93 and later implementation  of EMU, is  discussed in  subsection 2.4.3. 
Given the uncertainty about whether some countries would be able to 
meet the no-devaluation-for-two-years criterion when it becomes binding, 
a current devaluation would lower the perceived probability of EMU com- 
ing into effect. 
14. The model would predict that not all currencies would be equally affected by  conta- 
gion. For strong currencies with P = 0 originally, the increase in 2 would still leave i < 5, 
so that equilibrium .rr(q,Z)  will still equal zero and no change in speculative pressures will 
be observed. For other currencies, however, a successful speculative attack elsewhere will 
increase already present speculative pressures or will introduce them if  absent (i.e., where 
the increase in Z pushes i  above 5,  so that 7~ rises from zero to G(i(n,~,z))  > 0). 64  Allan Drazen 
One caveat concerns the previously discussed possibility that the failure 
of  a large country to meet the convergence criteria might create the ex- 
pectation that the criteria themselves would be changed so much that the 
devaluation has no effect on perceptions about the likelihood of EMU. As 
discussed above, there appears to be no evidence for this extreme view. 
When Italy or the United Kingdom withdrew in September 1992, the per- 
ception was quite the opposite; namely, raising serious questions about 
the future of EMU. Hence, in terms of the model, the EMU convergence 
criteria imply that a devaluation by one potential EMU country will lower 
Z for all other potential EMU members.lS 
Will the reduced possibility of EMU lower the “political resolve” of 
countries that have maintained the fixed parity and make them more likely 
to devalue? There is much to suggest that this may be the case. First, there 
seems no doubt that the desire to play a role, preferably an important one 
in the EMU, was a factor in decisions not to devalue. For example, in his 
discussion  of  monetary  policy in  the  EMS during this  period,  Melitz 
(1995) asks why many countries (especially France) followed Germany’s 
lead in adopting tight monetary policy though they were going through 
recessions. Given France’s lower inflation than Germany’s and its high 
unemployment, there is no reason a devaluation would have led markets 
to question  France’s monetary discipline. To explain the policy choice, 
Melitz argues that “the French official behavior can best be explained on 
the basis of long-run political goals. By maintaining the policy of the  franc 
for?, the French authorities wished to promote the aim of monetary union 
and, in addition, assure themselves an important place, along Germany’s 
side, in future European monetary control” (1995, 26). 
An even stronger statement of how new information about the political 
“will” in  one country affects currency values in other countries can be 
found in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993). Speaking about the relation 
between speculative pressures  and the prospects for EMU, they write: 
“Until the summer of 1992, anticipations of a smooth transition to mone- 
tary union had stabilized expectations and hence the operation  of the 
EMS. At that point, the protracted process of negotiation and ratification 
allowed doubts to surface about whether the treaty would ever come into 
effect. This altered the costs and benefits of  the policies of austerity re- 
quired of countries seeking to qualify for European monetary union, lead- 
ing the markets to anticipate that those policies would ultimately be aban- 
doned” (1993, 52). They go on to argue that this may have played a role 
in the fall 1992 crisis. They suggest, as I have, that in making policy de- 
cisions, these governments traded  off  the costs of high unemployment 
against the benefits associated with qualifying for monetary union. Were 
15. Moreover, as discussed in subsection 2.4.3, the perception that membership criteria 
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the benefits of the latter reduced, the government’s calculations would be 
affected. They write: 
An implication of this trade-off is that the stability of exchange rates 
should be correlated with the prospects for European monetary union. 
This was clearly the case in 1992. The weakness of the lira dated from 
the day the negative outcome of the Danish referendum was known. 
The lira, the British pound, the Danish krone, and the French franc all 
fell on June 3, the first day after the referendum. The Danish nej was a 
surprise; it had not been forecast by the opinion polls. Initially, reports 
stated that legal experts saw no way the Maastricht treaty, or even parts 
of  it,  could  be  approved  and enacted  by  only eleven EC members. 
Doubts were compounded by  press reports that confusion about the 
treaty’s viability would stoke German concerns about the wisdom of 
pressing ahead with  European monetary  union.  Italian  businessmen 
voiced fears that Danish rejection would undermine Italy’s resolve to 
comply with the convergence criteria laid down at Maastricht.I6 
The Eichengreen-Wyplosz argument is clearly close to the argument 
about membership contagion presented here, though it is not a contagion 
story per se, whereby weakness in one currency weakens another via the 
political decision-making mechanism. It is more accurately characterized 
as a nondevaluation, common shock-the  negative outcome of the Dan- 
ish referendum and, more generally, of the process of protracted negoti- 
ations mentioned  in  the first quote-hitting  all  currencies  before  any 
one of them is attacked. But the arguments are similar, each stressing how 
what are termed here membership effects can weaken the currencies of 
potential members in a club. The argument in this paper takes the Eichen- 
green-Wyplosz argument one step further, showing how membership ef- 
fects can induce contagion in currency crises. 
2.6  Conclusions 
The argument here was not meant to suggest that membership conta- 
gion explains the EMS crisis of 1992-93  to the exclusion of other factors. 
German monetary policy had “monsoonal” effects, and spillovers of com- 
petitiveness clearly played a role in some of the EMS devaluations, as they 
have in other contagious currency crises. The purpose of the paper was to 
highlight a political mechanism for contagion that may have played a role 
in recent currency crises but has received no careful discussion in the liter- 
ature. The discussion in section 2.5 should make clear the importance of 
external political events for currency crises in general and the possibility 
16. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993, 85-86).  For references on these, especially quotes 
in the Financial  Times, 4 June 1992, 23 June 1992, on Italy, see n. 43 of Eichengreen and 
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of  contagious membership effects in  particular.  Moreover, such effects 
need not be limited to explicit monetary unions. The next step is to find 
stronger evidence of such membership effects, in both explicit and implicit 
cooperative arrangements. It will not be easy, but it may be quite worth- 
while. 
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Comment  Carmen M. Reinhart 
Drazen’s paper represents a first effort to formalize the role of political 
considerations in the process of how currency crises are transmitted across 
international borders. The theoretical literature on “contagion” is scarce, 
and the empirical literature equally so. Yet  the EMS currency crises of 
1992-93,  the aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis of late  1994, and the 
meltdown of several Asian currencies in 1997 all have a flavor of “conta- 
gious currency crises.” Thus gaining a better understanding of the chan- 
nels for contagion is a fruitful and timely line of inquiry. 
The concept of political contagion stressed in the paper has been largely 
ignored in the literature, if not in the statements of those individuals ulti- 
mately responsible for monetary and exchange rate policy decisions, as we 
are reminded in this paper. Political contagion revolves around the policy 
trade-off between the political losses incurred if  policymakers decide to 
devalue and the economic gains achieved by doing so. The political losses 
arise primarily because policymakers wish to belong to a “club” that re- 
quires them to maintain the exchange rate peg as the fee for membership. 
The benefits from staying in the club are largely political and may accrue 
over the medium to long term. Contagion, in this context, arises if an 
“important” member of the club devalues, thereby reducing the resolve of 
other club members to maintain  the peg.  This is referred to as “true” 
contagion and distinguished from “monsoonal effects,” which arise from 
economic transmission mechanisms. Importantly in this model, it is as- 
sumed that it is policymakers who decide which of the other club members 
influence their decision to devalue. Furthermore, devaluation is a political 
decision, not the inevitable outcome of the depletion of central bank re- 
serves following bouts of speculative attacks. 
The trade-off between the economic gains of abandoning the peg and 
the credibility losses incurred in this model is common to “second genera- 
tion” models of currency crises. For instance, the cost of maintaining the 
peg is rising unemployment or prohibitive debt-servicing costs (see Obst- 
feld  1996). In any case, the policymakers’ decision to devalue improves 
the economic situation even if it ruins their credibility. 
Carmen M. Reinhart is professor in the School of Public Affairs and the Department of 
Economics of  the University of Maryland, College Park, and a research associate of the 
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I will group my  remarks into three areas: the first pertains directly to 
the model outlined in this paper, the second is addressed  to a broader 
family of second-generation  balance-of-payments crisis models, and my 
final remarks apply to an even broader family of balance-of-payments cri- 
sis models that encompass first-generation, Krugman-type models. 
As regards the political contugion model, it is evident that this paper 
offers valuable insights in  understanding  a “peer pressure”  mechanism 
that may play a key role in influencing whether a country devalues or not, 
especially in the context of a club, such as a currency union. The EMS 
during the ERM currency crises of  1992-93  stands out in  this regard. 
Besides introducing political considerations into the contagion process, 
the model  is  also useful in  explaining why  contagion  may be  regional 
rather than global. Perhaps this is an area that merits more attention and 
discussion in the paper. Specifically, the parameter 2,  which summarizes 
the value to the country of being in the club, could be a weighted sum of 
the number of countries that satisfy the membership criteria, with weights 
depending on the importance for the home country of a given country’s 
participation. Hence, a member of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union may attach very little consequence to the collapse of a peg in far- 
away Thailand but a great deal of importance to a similar event in a neigh- 
boring country, one that is perceived to be an important member of the 
club. Though the empirical literature is  scanty, the results in Calvo and 
Reinhart  (1996) and  Frankel  and  Schmukler  (1996) suggest contagion 
tends to be regional rather than global. The evidence of contagion in Eich- 
engreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) may also point in that direction, as the 
bulk of their sample countries are in Europe. 
Having said this, I do not think this model (in its present form) helps 
us to understand contagious crises in emerging markets. Judging from the 
emphasis on the ERM crisis, perhaps this was intentional. First, there is 
the assumption that devaluation is a matter of political choice. This pre- 
sumes, as acknowledged in the paper, that the central bank has access to 
ample lines of credit should it need it to support the currency. The central 
banks of most emerging markets have limited access, if  any, to interna- 
tional credit. At the time of devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 
1994, the stock of central bank reserves at hand could be best character- 
ized as pocket change. The same can be said of the flotation of the Thai 
baht in July 1997, once the forward position of the central bank was taken 
into account. Devaluation was a necessity, not a choice. 
Second, the club is exclusively defined by the politicians. It is they who 
determine which countries weigh heavily in their resolve to maintain the 
peg and which do not. Yet many emerging countries do not get to choose 
which club they belong to. Korean politicians in 1997 thought they were 
joining the club known as the OECD; financial markets became convinced 
that Korea was a member of a different club, that of ailing tigers. Argenti- Political Contagion in Currency Crises  69 
na’s currency board came under severe attack and Brazil’s real less so fol- 
lowing the peso’s slide, not because these countries shared an explicit or 
implicit currency arrangement with Mexico, but because international fi- 
nancial markets decided they belonged to the failed exchange-rate-based 
inflation stabilization club. Thus is may be a fruitful exercise in the context 
of this model to explore the possible endogeneity of 2,  which may be time 
varying and depend on both the types of shocks the economy is subjected 
to, q,  and the market’s assessment of the probability of devaluation, p. 
Third, it is assumed, and this applies to other models that stress con- 
flicting policy objectives, that the political and credibility losses of aban- 
doning the peg are compensated by  the economic gains from doing so. 
Central to this argument is the premise that devaluations are expansion- 
ary. Indeed, rumor has it that Nigel Lawson was happily singing in the 
shower hours after the devaluation of the pound during the ERM crisis. I 
would argue that a better  characterization of the emerging market di- 
lemma is as follows: If the country does not devalue and maintains tight 
monetary and fiscal policies to defend the peg, it has a recession-witness 
Argentina’s 5.8 percent decline in GDP  in 1995. If, on the other hand, the 
central bank caves in and devalues, the country also has a recession- 
recall Mexico’s 6.2 percent decline in GDP during 1995 and Indonesia’s 
13.7 percent collapse of GDP  in 1998. The bulk of the empirical evidence 
suggests that devaluations are contractionary in developing countries (see, 
e.g., Edwards  1989)-so  much for relieving pressures on the unemploy- 
ment rate. Furthermore, devaluation does not help relieve debt-servicing 
burdens through the mechanism of lower interest rates, as in industrial 
countries, which primarily have domestic currency debt. Foreign currency 
debt weighs heavily in both public and private sectors in most developing 
countries. 
Hence, I would argue that models (such as this one) that focus on con- 
flicting objectives provide insights into the crisis and, in this case, conta- 
gion process in industrial countries but are less helpful in understanding 
currency crises in emerging markets, which are usually followed by output 
collapses. In recent months, for instance, growth forecasts for the infected 
Asian countries have been continuously marked down, highlighting that 
their experience does not differ from others in this regard. Calvo’s time- 
to-build model, for instance, suggests outcomes that are more in line with 
the stylized facts just described (see chap. 3 in this volume). 
Last, to understand the causes and timing of crises and mechanisms of 
contagion, it may be necessary to rethink some of the assumptions embed- 
ded in both first- and second-generation models. Central to these models 
is the shared feature of the rational forward-looking speculator. Yet  the 
empirical evidence is far from conclusive in providing support for the view 
that markets are forward looking. In our work we found that interest rates 
and domestic-foreign interest rate differentials had no valuable predictive 70  Allan Drazen 
power, either in absolute terms or relative to other indicators, when it came 
to anticipating currency crises (see Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). Gold- 
fajn and Valdes  (2000) reach  a similar conclusion when  analyzing the 
predictive ability of currency forecasts culled from the Financial Times 
surveys. Rating agencies do just as badly (see Goldstein, Kaminsky, and 
Reinhart 2000). The widespread use of mechanical backward-looking fil- 
ter rules for trading decisions in financial markets also suggests that not 
all speculators know or care about economic or political fundamentals. 
Perhaps it is time to incorporate some of these features when we  attempt 
to model “true” contagion, which I would define differently than in the 
paper, since I would suggest that medium- to longer-term political goals 
are also part of the broader set of “fundamentals” and the spirit of “true” 
contagion is to be found in herding behavior or animal spirits. 
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